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Digital ventures seek to scale their user base quickly 
and effectively across markets in order to lock out 
competitors and drive adoption through positive 
feedback loops. We view such rapid global scaling as an 
organising logic by which ventures replicate a generic 
solution to recurring challenges, that are found in 
expanding a user base across markets; which is usually 
characterized by slight variables in their conditions. We 
distinguish and describe this as a process of “generative 
pattern replication”, where an existing scaling pattern 
is specialised to the specific circumstances of the new 
market, and applied there.  For our study we looked at 
BlaBlaCar, a ridesharing venture that has rapidly 
scaled its business into 22 markets, to gain a better 
understanding about this generative process. Our 
research contributes to the digital innovation literature 
by proposing a novel perspective on the scaling of 
digital ventures. 
1. Introduction 
The user base, that is, the number of users who 
have registered for a service, is often used as a key 
indicator of success for digital ventures [21, 41]. 
Since it assigns weight and legitimacy to a new digital 
service, the velocity of user base growth [28, 30, 34, 
38, 41] is a major interest point for any digital 
venture. For instance, since its inception in 2009, 
Uber scaled its user base to 8 million members in 67 
countries [20]. Similarly, Airbnb reached 60 million 
users in 190 countries [2]. 
As unprecedented scaling dynamics become more 
commonplace, the industrial-age understanding of 
scaling becomes less relevant [45]. Traditionally, 
scaling was often associated with acquiring new 
resources to expand the capacity of a business to meet 
increases in demand [29, 33]. It involved reducing the 
cost of production, and a core element in achieving 
“economies of scale” was to standardise production 
to drive down marginal cost [1, 9]. 
Prior research on rapid scaling of the user base of 
digital ventures focused on the underlying 
mechanisms within a single regional market, 
producing explanations for how to build and sustain 
momentum [21]. However, many digital ventures are 
driven by “winner-takes-it-all” perceptions [11, 19, 
32], which leads them to seek rapid scaling across 
several markets. This in turn brings about the 
challenge of how to expand successfully to a global 
foothold, whilst knowing that many markets exhibit 
(slightly) different characteristics. As our 
understanding of digital innovation develops [10, 22, 
44, 45], it’s important to understand more about the 
processes behind digital ventures’ capacities to scale. 
Thus, this research addresses the following research 
question: 
What is the process by which digital ventures 
scale their user base across market boundaries? 
The approach pertinent to our research is that of 
scaling via replication, following a digital organising 
logic, as opposed to the industrial-era logic of scaling 
via resource acquisition [cf. 29]. To this end, we 
provide a case study of BlaBlaCar, a ridesharing 
service, which scaled to 25 million users across 22 
markets within 9 years. This case serves as the 
empirical grounding in which to develop a process 
model of scaling through “generative pattern 
replication”, wherein an existing pattern is 
specialised to the local circumstances and then 
leveraged to scale effectively. 
A digital venture attains and improves such a 
scaling pattern through repeated application of a 
replication process: transfer a successful digital 
service to a new market, then adapt it to the specific 
local conditions, without redefining the service, and 
focus on scaling the user base. Once such a process 
has been repeated a few times, it forms a generic 
pattern that can be applied, and be further improved, 
when confronted with a new market. 
Leveraging such an emergent pattern allows a 
digital venture to scale rapidly through replication, 
without the need to reinvent the wheel in each new 
market. This is enabled by digital infrastructure and 
the specifics of digital technology, and thus a 
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departure from traditional scaling strategies. Hence, 
our research is a contribution to the digital innovation 
literature. It proposes opportunities not only for 
research, but also actionable knowledge for growing 
successful digital ventures. 
2. Conceptual grounding 
2.1. Scaling 
Chandler [9] offers rich accounts of industrial age 
firms and their scaling logic. Scaling of firms such as 
General Motors (GM) required substantial up-front 
investment for it to build the infrastructure that would 
support the scaling efforts of an industrial age firm. 
Scaling and growth, as described by the industrial-age 
logic in [8, 9, 24, 39], emphasise driving down unit cost 
of production to gain competitive advantage [40]. 
The scaling of ventures such as BlaBlaCar and 
Airbnb, suggests a different approach to scaling logic; 
as they required considerably less time to scale in 
comparison to industrial ones. For example, both 
BlaBlaCar and Airbnb expanded into their first foreign 
markets three years after their founding, whereas it took 
GM fifteen years. Likewise, BlaBlaCar reached twenty 
million users in nine years, and Airbnb amassed sixty 
million users in only eight years, while GM again lagged 
behind, and needed thirty years to have produced twenty 
million cars, and another fourteen years to hit the fifty 
million mark [2, 4, 20]. 
One of the starting-point of this paper is that this 
difference in scaling can be traced to how digital 
ventures draw on already existing digital infrastructures 
[cf. 21]. Rather than making significant investments in 
proprietary production technologies and distribution 
systems, in order to reach economies of scale [9], digital 
ventures are able to exploit existing digital 
infrastructures. They focus on amassing a large user 
base at speed, in a bid to disrupt the market and lock out 
competition. This is possible since the costs of 
reproducing digital technology, once the initial design is 
developed, become negligible [7]. Furthermore, the 
modular and layered architecture of digital technology 
[18, 45] creates infinite opportunities for flexible 
configurations and customisations. It creates 
possibilities for cheaply modifying existing 
technologies when and where needed to sustain growth. 
Digital technology has therefore had a huge impact on 
organisations, their strategies [45], and their ability to 
scale rapidly [21]. This impact extends beyond the 
industrial-age logic to explain scaling, requiring new 
approaches suitable for the digital age [26, 31]. 
Industrial theories of scaling and competitive 
advantage rely on a firm’s ability to find and acquire 
costly to copy inputs for production and distribution. 
Unlike tangible assets, their digital counterparts incur 
costs merely at the design stage not during reproduction 
and distribution [35]. Moreover, digital technologies 
have no natural capacity limits for copies. The 
foundation of a competitive advantage, then, is not in 
driving down production costs, but rather finding a 
superior design, then being able to diffuse it rapidly on 
a global scale, that allows for the perfecting of the 
design during scaling. 
2.2. Network effects as motivation for scaling 
One of the motivations for rapid growth is the 
prospect of network externalities, derived from the user 
base [17, 25, 32, 36, 37]. Many digital ventures are in a 
hurry to scale because the power of network effects 
helps to achieve and sustain growth that is self- 
reinforcing. Once the number of users who adopt the 
digital technology reaches a critical point, the value of 
that platform for potential users increases rapidly. This 
creates positive feedback loops and incentives for their 
existing users to stay, and others to join become high, 
all whilst creating less room for competition [12, 13]. 
Gaining the momentum of network effects in digital 
ventures such as Uber and Airbnb might mean longer 
lead times, but these are then followed by explosive 
growth (sometimes referred to as ‘hockey stick’ growth 
trajectories). As such, scaling in digital ventures is a 
strategic imperative, but not to for the achievement of 
the production side economies of scale, but for the 
demand side economies of scale, granted through the 
network effects [35]. 
Because of such long lead times, and the 
significance of the user base, profit, or other financial 
metrics, which are often used to measure the success of 
a traditional business, do not reflect the true value of a 
digital venture. It is foreseeable that for a continued 
period of time it may operate at a loss, on the promise 
of explosive growth and subsequent profit generation 
later. Thus, the size of a user base is an important 
success metric, especially when it comes to digital 
technology that bank on network effects [25]. 
2.3. Scaling via replication 
When viewing scaling from a global perspective, 
digital ventures are faced with a task of meeting local 
user needs fast whilst maintaining a competitive global 
product and a coherent brand. Schilling [32] looked 
beyond idiosyncratic forces in locking out competitive 
technologies, to be able to secure winner take all market 
dominance (specifically modelling and prediction). The 
author highlights the significance of a “hidden order 
underlying a complex system” [32, p.395] in an 
organisation that allows the leveraging of information 
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and knowledge in a way that creates opportunities for 
modelling and prediction. Leveraging a system of 
previously proven successful and generic solutions, and 
then applying them to recurring problems in varied 
market conditions is a challenge digital ventures are 
faced with when scaling across boundaries. 
The nature of digital products and services at its core 
is almost a prerequisite for replication. The properties of 
digital technology create very favourable conditions and 
incentives for ventures to scale rapidly by replication. A 
working digitally powered idea, once gained proof of 
concept, can be replicated globally with almost instant 
market domination. Previously mentioned examples of 
Uber and Airbnb quickly proved sustainable ways of 
meeting user needs with digital technology, and 
replicated the same business model globally, whilst 
precisely nailing down local demand specificities. 
Replication as a business strategy has previously 
been explored and advocated in the work of Winter and 
Szulanski [43], who build their replication arguments on 
very tangible, chain and franchise like businesses, using 
examples such as [6], who explains cloning of units in 
chains, and [33] who describes the case of adaptation 
and tuning of the model with traces of the origins of the 
concept. 
Winter and Szulanski [43] contrast two views on 
replication: exploitation and exploration and highlight 
them as two phases of replication. Exploitation, that is, 
repeated replication of a simple recipe or formula, which 
is assumed to be known and reproduced accurately each 
time it is replicated [43, p.730]; and exploration, 
whereby a business model is discovered and refined by 
choosing the components for replication in suitable 
locations, developing capabilities to routinize 
knowledge transfer, and maintaining the model once it 
has been replicated [43, p.731]. The transition between 
the two is a critical point of creating capabilities that 
support the replication processes and activities to 
follow.  
Organisational theory suggests that replication is 
difficult and therefore organisations tend to merely 
adapt to the specificities of the market [14]. 
Nevertheless, [33] distinguished between firm’s 
adaptive responses and creative responses. The latter are 
more likely to be innovation-driven and not just 
adaptations to the market specificities. Weick [42] 
however suggested that a firm’s ability to influence, 
construct or enact its environment is dependent on the 
size. The notion of size in the context of digital ventures, 
in particular in their early days, has a different 
connotation than the industrial scaling logic, whereby 
companies exert market power, or rely on economies of 
scale. In the context of digital ventures that grow by 
replicating, in order for replication to work it “requires 
the capability to recreate complex, imperfectly 
understood, and partly tacit productive processes” [43, 
p.731]. Therefore, in digital ventures size-related 
benefits emerge as replication capability evolves with 
the number of replications, and learning spaces that 
increase with more markets to replicate into as well as 
more trials and errors to learn from. With this, the ability 
to spot and leverage a pattern increases the number of 
opportunities to scale through replication, in a way that 
creates complex landscapes of innovation [5] and not 
just market adaptation. 
The capabilities to support the transition exist in 
forms of knowledge assets codified in frameworks, 
blueprint, templates, best practices, or according to [43] 
in a form of a historic template. These have often been 
used in contexts of global roll-outs of standardised 
information systems, where organisations face 
challenges of balancing local needs with global 
standards, standardisation and flexibility. Building on 
[27], [43] define a template as a guiding example for 
reproducing success enjoyed at a particular original 
setting [43, p.734]. Shapiro and Varian [35] reflect on 
flexibility of such a pattern as an important aspect of 
successful replication. A pattern needs to be principled 
but flexible enough in order to understand the actual 
core of the success of the business, contrasting with the 
extreme emphasis on precise replication. In the context 
of replication in digital ventures, powered by the 
modular, and malleable nature of technology, ventures 
extend replication with an aspect of generativity [46] 
present in the process of scaling through pattern 
replication. 
2.4. Scaling through generative pattern replication 
Alexander [3] views patterns as responses to 
problems which occur over and over again in a 
particular environment. Patterns are generic, and build 
on specialization; since patterns can be used again and 
again, without the need for using it the same way twice. 
Gamma [15], building on this work, defines patterns as 
“descriptions […] that are customized to solve a general 
design problem in a particular context”. 
In line with Alexander’s understanding of the 
generativity of the patterns, we envision the original 
‘master’ pattern as providing the structure that enables 
the creation of the ‘mutated’ patterns in the most 
appropriate way to the setting and problem they are 
trying to solve. Each new pattern embodies and carries 
the structure of the ‘master’ pattern, despite being a 
solution that had not be applied before, but within the 
same framework of guidelines that form a generative 
structure of the pattern. This enables teams to create 
their own solutions when solving problems in an infinite 
variety of ways, replicating broad ideas and components 
instead of specific solutions. Alexander [3] argues that 
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generative patterns are not just collections of good ideas 
and practices, but rather coherent structures that allow 
to generate coherent entities and solutions. 
The   balance   of   structure   and   guidelines with 
innovation and creativity is central to Alexander’s way 
of thinking about generative patterns. Based on this we 
believe a generative scaling pattern is both generic and 
specific at the same time, and can create indefinite 
recombination possibilities. The pattern, once attained, 
introduces an element of standardisation to the 
replication process and can help to allocate resources 
and make strategic decisions that are more effective 
over time, whilst preventing unnecessary duplication of 
efforts. Instead of designing resource-consuming 
strategies for each country, elements of the pattern could 
be used as tools to draw the necessary resources 
together. Furthermore, the more markets the pattern was 
used to expand into, and learnt from, the better the 
pattern can become. Experiences and learnings that 
evolve with scaling are documented and formalised then 
fed into the scaling pattern. 
On the other hand, patterns translated for local 
demands increase the number of possible solutions and 
innovations available at any point in time. This can help 
deliver novel, fast and effective responses to an 
emerging opportunity, even in a non-existing market. 
Patterns not only serve as a basis for localised decision 
making, but also as a tool for unlocking innovation 
opportunities, for teams and individuals, regardless of 
their expertise and experience. Documented patterns 
can allow organisations to bridge a gap in understanding 
for non-experts and experts shuffled in a matrix 
structure. This is crucial in the increasingly 
multicultural environment digital ventures operate in, 
where challenges of coordination collide with the need 
to retain the start-up culture and team agility. Generative 
pattern replication distributes the power to innovate 
beyond top decision makers. 
3. Methods 
We have carried out an in-depth study of a 
ridesharing venture called BlaBlaCar. During this study 
BlaBlaCar boasted a user base of twenty-five million 
members that doubled last year. Since company’s 
expansion into its first foreign market in 2009, 
BlaBlaCar rapidly grew into twenty-two countries, 
through a mix of acquisitions, and new market entries, 
spanning across three continents. We selected 
BlaBlaCar as an extreme case [16] because of its rapid 
scaling in an international context. BlaBlaCar also 
represents a new breed of digital ventures with similar 
growth trajectories, such as the previously mentioned 
AirBnB and Uber. This offers opportunities for 
generating findings and theory that can help explain the 
user base scaling mechanisms of other digital ventures. 
Further to this, we gained access to the company and 
were presented with an opportunity to collect rich 
primary data, which we supplemented with secondary   
data, spanning our data analysis across three sources: 
interviews, archival data and participant observation. 
Rapid scaling does not allow for a constant 
organisational structure, but current teams are divided 
into Members Relations, Growth, Tech, New Business, 
Product, Communications, Marketing & Design, and 
Admin. Within this division there are local and global 
teams split based on their activities as either being on 
the ground on a day to day basis, or offering support and 
coordination to local teams within global strategic 
vision. At the time of data collection there were twenty-
two local teams spread across fifteen countries. We   
conducted fifty-eight semi structured, audio taped 
interviews with country managers, members of local 
and global teams. 
Archival data included reports and project 
descriptions, as well as various company internal and 
external presentation material. In addition, the 
researcher spent four months in the organization as a 
participant observer, attending meetings, workshops, 
presentations, and training sessions. During this time 
several informal interviews were also conducted. 
Following [23] theorisation from process data we 
conducted several stages of data analysis, mapping out 
tasks and outputs for each respective stage. We began 
by filtering and labelling the data with open coding. This 
has allowed us to trace instances of pattern and 
replication. We then constructed a case narrative to 
depict the evolution of the replication logic at 
BlaBlaCar, identifying three phases. We further 
explored the data with selective coding to understand 
the linkages between different elements of pattern 
replication. Through this we arrived at the current 
visualisation of the process of scaling of user base 
through pattern replication, initiating explanations of 
several elements of generative pattern replication. 
4. The case of ridesharing 
BlaBlaCar is one of the digital pioneers of 
ridesharing that successfully built a marketplace for 
passengers wishing to travel and drivers with empty car 
seats on long distance trips. This niche service quickly 
established a foothold in the native French market, that 
grew into a single European marketplace, and 
eventually into Asia and Latin America. Figure 1 shows 
the numerous diverse markets BlaBlaCar entered since 
its inception in 2006. 
The marketplace was achieved by a mix of acqui- 
hiring, that is taking over small European ridesharing 
startups, whilst hiring the entire teams (e.g. Superdojazd 
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in Poland or Rides in Mexico), as well as launching 
clusters of geographically and culturally similar 
countries with high levels of cross border trips (e.g. 
Podorozhniki in Ukraine and Russia or AutoHop in 
Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Romania). A    number of 
markets were also built up from scratch (e.g. Spain, UK, 
Germany). 
By tracing the events that preceded global 
ridesharing success, we create a scaling timeline 
consisting of three phases. Phase 1 (2006-09) was 
bracketed as a garage phase where the product was 
incepted, highlighting a period of development of the 
core of the business model. Phase 2 (2010-2013) 
indicates first instance of cross boundary knowledge 
transfer and business model replication – into Spain, as 
well as rapid scaling into another nine markets in 
Western Europe with monetisation bottlenecks. Phase 3 
(2014- ongoing) is characterised by replication outside 
of business model tested Western Europe into Eastern 
Europe, Asia and Latin America, fuelled by large 
fundraising episodes. In this phase we observe 
monetisation, and booking system replication as more 
weighted and rolled out in stages as a result of 
leveraging and transferring of the stock of knowledge 




Figure 1. Market growth timeline 
Phase 1 (2006-2009) commenced with a launch of 
the company Covoiturage, and the first website. This 
phase can be described as a ‘garage phase’, where the 
concept of online ridesharing was being refined. 
Covoiturage enjoyed organic growth with little 
investment and effort, based on the attractiveness of the 
digitally enabled ridesharing. The main focus of the 
phase is the development of the core of the product: 
“There was a three to four-year garage phase, right, 
where things weren’t quite right yet. I think ratings for 
instance were introduced in 2009 which speaks to having the 
right product, right. It takes time to have really the product 
that is going to crack the market...”, Growth Team Member. 
The service started gaining momentum in 2007, 
when a series of transport industry strikes left few other 
travel options for the French public and a large number 
of signups created positive liquidity, matching between 
drivers and passengers and their travel plans. This was 
the turning point in the development of BlaBlaCar. This 
demand spike led to the opening of their first office in 
Paris, and subsequent hiring of their first employee in 
2008. 
An initial consumer to consumer (C2C) offering was 
expanded into a business to business (B2B) platform, 
selling services to local companies and authorities. B2B 
quickly became a source of revenue in contrast to a free 
C2C platform, which on the other hand was growing 
faster with fewer resources. Despite the profitability, 
B2B required high client customisation and this had 
little scalability potential, making BlaBlaCar rethink the 
business model. BlaBlaCar spotted positive feedback 
loops that would allow rapid growth to their user base in 
both France and internationally, as to redirect its focus 
entirely to scaling the C2C platform. Scalability 
becomes the centre of the team’s focus: 
“[We] realized that C2C marketplace is growing much 
faster and on its own and in a more efficient way with a lot of 
traction. Much more than the B2B platform that's less scalable 
with a lot of education, communication skills required…It was 
a different business model but that's not where the growth is 
so they needed to make their bets”, Global Team Member. 
Up until the introduction of the current business 
model at the end of 2011/early 2012 Covoiturage 
trialled a series of business model options. The move 
towards the right business model and ‘proof of concept’ 
in France resulted in BlaBlaCar raising €600,000 in 
2009. Following this, with the right product and 
financial resources, BlaBlaCar was able to launch the 
first market outside of France: 
“And then from having the right product then you start 
getting traction in the market, investors can see that, they back 
you with money and suddenly you have the budget to really 
explode. And also hire people or acquire other teams…”, 
Growth Team Member. 
In December 2009 the company announced an 
expansion to Spain replicating the service and product 
under the name Comuto, and launched its first mobile 
application. 
Phase 2 (2010-2013). In 2010 further €1.25 million 
investment was secured. In the same year European 
transport infrastructure got shaken up by an eruption of 
volcano Eyjafjallajökull, causing air travel disruption 
across Europe and creating a surge in demand, and 
subsequent high price and low availability of other 
‘traditional’ means of transport. This event created 
undoubted traffic to the BlaBlaCar website and 
heightened public and media interest across Europe. 
In December 2011 BlaBlaCar received a further 
investment of $10 million. In May 2011 BlaBlaCar 
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entered its third market – the UK and reached its first 
millionth members. At this point the team started seeing 
patterns of growth, similarities in markets and 
opportunities for replication of the French market 
scaling trajectories: 
“At the time, we were starting to operate in three countries 
and we already started to see that we could draw patterns from 
one country and apply it to another one, find levers that 
worked somewhere and try them somewhere else. That was the 
focus at first then you grew around that...”, Growth Team 
Manager. 
As a result of drawing on these patterns, the year of 
2012 saw rapid expansion across Europe, starting in 
Italy in May with an acquisition of a local startup 
PostoinAuto. In October BlaBlaCar launched in 
Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, as well 
as Poland by acquiring another on the ground start up 
Superdojazd. The focus on scalability created the need 
for a stronger international brand. Toward the end of 
2012 the company consolidated Covoiturage and 
Comuto under one global brand and name – BlaBlaCar: 
“The first name of the company was Covoiturage, which 
means ridesharing in French, which is the wrong name 
because you’re never going to expand. So, initially its easy 
because it’s good for SEO, so it’s kind of an easy way to start 
your business as an Internet company, but it doesn’t scale, 
right, so we had to rebrand”, COO, speaking at Webrazzi. 
BlaBlaCar had on place the product, the team of 
founders, nine markets, the brand, and the finance, and 
so they began the project of monetizing the service. The 
finalised business model, online booking system, was to 
become transactional, based on an inbuilt booking 
which levies a fee on each trip. The nature of the system 
allowed to maximise scalability. More first time users 
were attracted to a legitimised and governed ridesharing 
service, as the booking system added a layer of security 
and trust to the platform. The system simplified the 
booking process and on board logistics of a ride, 
reduced cancellations and improved members’ 
commitment. A member of a global team summarises 
the role of the booking system as follows: 
“…Our belief is the more present that we can be as a third 
party inside that connection, the better it is because we can 
add value, add confidence, add service layers, add customer 
support. So everything that we can, any way we can structure 
the transaction and be present, not just enable but be present 
throughout that transaction, is a good thing for us”, Global 
Team Member. 
The booking systems were first rolled out in France 
and Spain. The successes and errors from the transition 
in France and Spain were transferred across other 
markets, and became the basis for launching all 
consecutive local systems. A member of a global team 
emphasises the role of sharing and replication in 
booking transition: 
“…The booking transition in Spain which was the first one 
after France was a bit difficult to handle because there was a 
great backlash of the community whereas now we’ve 
transitioned many other countries, progressively there was 
very different strategic approach especially on the Comms 
side. And what you have seen what is happening currently in 
Italy is much more smoother actually in terms of change, so 
we are seeing how much we are sharing more and more 
really”, Global Team Member. 
In April 2013 BlaBlaCar stood up to its main 
European competitor, a local German ridesharing start 
up, and launched in Germany, announcing five million 
members. 
Phase 3 (2014-ongoing). Shortly after launching 
Germany, BlaBlaCar makes a decision to step out of 
Western and Central Europe, and into Russia and 
Ukraine in February 2014 through the acquisition of 
Podorozhniki. In summer 2014 an investment 
announcement was made: $100 million would be made 
available to bankroll BlaBlaCar’s expansion into Asia 
and South America. Company launches its first country 
outside Europe – Turkey in September 2014 and 
announces plans to launch India, Mexico, and Brazil. At 
this point BlaBlaCar boasted 200% year on year growth, 
with 10 million registered users. Continuing with 
monetization many other countries have initiated the 
switch to online booking, which in terms of both the 
product features and the roll out process was altered in 
light of every previous booking system launch. As a 
result, several booking system configurations were 
developed to suit the local needs and market intricacies 
and many countries begun the monetization with a non-
payment booking system, preparing the community for 
a smooth introduction of the payment: 
“So the challenge here is really to prepare this in the right 
way so there’s a lot of work planned maybe a year ahead to, 
especially in terms of payment …, we want to scale as much 
as we can and to have one product that scales everywhere in 
the world as much as we can, but when it comes to payment 
it’s just very country-specific”, Global Team Member. 
In September 2015 $200 million were raised, which 
allowed BlaBlaCar to launch in India in January 2015; 
the following month the acquisition of AutoHop and 
further expansion into Eastern Europe took place 
(launching Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Romania, in 
March of that year).   In April BlaBlaCar announces 
merger with a German competitor – Carpooling, 
transforming it into largest long distance ridesharing 
service in Europe and the world. 
In the same month, BlaBlaCar acquired Rides and 
launched Mexico whilst UK was being transferred to the 
online booking system, making it the third country to 
monetize. For the rest of the markets the gradual switch 
to the booking system was ongoing. The platform 
created by the booking system had opened multiple 
partnership and service extension opportunities for 
BlaBlaCar, such as one with global insurance giant 
AXA, offering additional insurance for all members, 
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rapidly increasing the value to users, boosting trust and 
attracting older demographic to the service. A global 
team member comments on the value of the booking 
system: 
“In that sense, in itself, [booking system] brings a lot of 
value and on top of that we can track and we can have a lot of 
knowledge then you can get many other things on top of it. 
Partnerships, extended business lines, extended services…”, 
Global Team Member. 
Later that year BlaBlaCar received a $1.6 billion 
valuation making it one of the Unicorn club companies, 
putting it alongside giants such as Uber, Airbnb, Spotify 
and Skyscanner. November 2015, another Latin 
American country was launched – Brazil, and in early 
2016 BlaBlaCar announced it launching Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. 
5. Scaling through pattern replication 
What can be traced from the case story is a gradual 
introduction of replication of learnings into global 
projects adjusted for local demands, such as in the 
example of their booking system and monetization roll 
out. The spotting and leveraging of patterns comes 
through initially in early country launches, in the 
consolidation towards a global recognisable brand, and 
in the search for a booking system with the maximum 
capacity to scale across boundaries. 
We traced several elements that form a structure for 
replication at BlaBlaCar. We found that scaling through 
pattern replication rests on three pillars: artifact, flexible 
organising, and value framing. 
A successful scaling strategy or technique gets 
reapplied, and becomes a pattern that can be replicated 
in other settings. Learnings from applying a pattern are 
captured as a framework in a playbook, and in this way 
disseminated across all teams. 
“Playbook is basically the know-how through trials and 
errors and successes that’s been formalised into a set of 
reasonable principles and processes that can be transferred to 
other teams easily so you can tell them “hey, this is what 
works/doesn’t work, this is the right approach, this is 
something that might or might not work and this is something 
that surely won’t work”, Growth Team Member. 
So, the first element of scaling through pattern 
replication is a physical manifestation of the pattern in 
the form of an artifact – a playbook. Any team member 
can access and replicate a pattern from a playbook, 
using it as a tool. Best practices in replicating a pattern 
are fed back to the playbook constantly and a pattern is 
then further circulated into multiple new versions of the 
pattern in local markets. The playbook acts as a 
conversion tool that allows the teams to process local 
learning into shared global best practices, that can then 
be adapted locally: either across boundaries or in the 
market where it originated as an advanced version of the 
original solution. 
The playbook embodies the pattern and serves as a 
carrier for knowledge, but it is only an extension of the 
learnings, held by ‘experts’ that have previously and 
successfully replicated a pattern. Replication becomes 
possible with high market and team mobility, required 
to pull resources when replicating the pattern effectively 
and rapidly. So, the second element of scaling through 
pattern replication is flexible organising – agile team 
structuring that allows to maintain a level of 
synchronisation across teams and boundaries, allocating 
patterns and team resources where they are needed most. 
Building on the playbook and the leveraging of agile 
teams allows to balance new business opportunities with 
growth of existing projects, local and global growth 
context, the need for operational, day to day running of 
the business with forward looking innovation 
strategizing. 
“So when building something you actually think that it 
should be scalable. So when structuring the team you will 
think already that we’re going to grow and you think “okay, 
so when we are going to be fifty how like would these 
processes be applicable or not”. So can I build such processes 
which would be applicable now as well as in ten years, you 
know, it’s something like that. And if your answer is ‘no’ then 
you should take this into consideration and take into account 
that “OK, now I am building something for one year, in one 
year we will need to change”, but ideally you try to find a way 
which would be scalable and applicable for twenty people, as 
well as thirty, as well as fifty”, Growth Team Member. 
The third element, value framing, is comprised of 10 
values, drawn up internally by the team, that govern 
everyday practices and processes in the organization. 
Values create a common ‘language’ and decision 
making reference point that facilitates boundary 
crossing and replication. 
“I mean the values are very much like…kind of prophecies 
you can point to… I remember I was speaking to one of the 
senior guys here and I was struggling working with maybe 5 
people in a cross project and also across a few countries and 
they deal with like 30-40 people. I’m like “how do you bring 
everybody to consensus without just saying ‘no, this is the way 
it’s going to be?” And he just pointed to the values and said 
you nudge them and in doing that everyone feels equal and 
there isn’t so much of like a sort of residue of politics…”, 
Global Team Member. 
Artifact, flexible organising and value framing 
create generic guidelines, a ‘safety net’ for replicating 
the pattern, in an autonomous way, on individual and 
company level, globally and locally, but within the 
overall company strategy and vision. 
“…we need to spend a lot of time understanding how to 
prioritise. So making sure that all markets get what they need. 
And beyond that it also requires us to set up frameworks. So 
rather than having a set, you know, set of rules, we actually 
set a framework that countries can adapt to their local needs”, 
Growth Team Member. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
The unique nature of digital technology [45], 
leveraged by digital ventures as they seek to address the 
needs of users, seems to trigger soaring scaling 
trajectories that lie outside our conventional 
understanding of economics of scale [cf. 9]. Stimulated 
by winner-takes-it-all perceptions [11, 32], digital 
ventures attempt to scale rapidly across market 
boundaries displaying varied market conditions. As this 
phenomenon becoming more common, we need to 
enrich our understanding of scaling in the digital age, 
especially across market boundaries. To this end, we 
studied BlaBlaCar, which scaled its business into 
twenty-two markets in roughly ten years’ time. We view 
this scaling as a process of pattern replication - 
successful strategies proven elsewhere, applied in 
solving emerging challenges in new settings. Our 
research aimed to trace this process, understand it and 
propose a model to explain it. 
Our research at BlaBlaCar uncovered the process 
and its elements by which digital ventures can extract 
and leverage patterns in scaling its user base across 
boundaries. The main contribution is the process model 
of Scaling through Generative Pattern Replication (see 
Figure 2) that offers a novel perspective on scaling of 
digital ventures. 
 





Generative Pattern Replication A process of replicating a scaling pattern (a generic solution to a particular setting) 
through the interaction between the three components: artifact, value framing and 
flexible organising, creating positive externalities for further pattern replication. 
Artifact A tangible embodiment of a scaling pattern that collates the outcomes of pattern 
replication through trials, errors and successes, formalising them into components- 
tools that can be easily transferred and leveraged across boundaries. 
Flexible Organizing A digital venture’s agile team structuring for maintaining a constant state of 
synchronisation across teams and boundaries. 
Value Framing Digital venture’s cultural values translated into a set of generic principles guiding 
internal processes and practices within the scaling through replication organising 
logic. 
User Base The number of users who have registered for a digital service. 
Cross Boundary Growth 
(= sum of all markets) 
Digital venture’s growth by rapidly launching new markets through generative 
pattern replication, aggregating the existing know how from previous launches. As 
the number of markets increases with cross boundary growth, network effects 
incentives for users become stronger, increasing the user base. 
Compound Growth 
(> sum of all markets) 
Digital venture’s growth by generating and synchronising knowledge across 
boundaries, redistributing the outcomes of generative pattern replication. As the 
value delivered to users increases with generative replication of projects, 




These patterns consist of components of different 
nature: physical artifact, serving as a shared resource 
used to collate the learnings when replicating patterns; 
agile team structure reflected in flexible organising that 
ensures cross team synchronisation when replicating; 
value framing that leverages venture’s cultural values to 
guide decision making, and maintain the teams focus on 
the scalability of replication. 
We understand generative pattern replication’s 
(GPR’s) impact on the growth of the user base in two 
ways: through cross boundary growth, which allows 
digital ventures to launch new markets quickly by 
leveraging the patterns, but also compound growth; 
increasing the value to the users, as each market from 
the outset contains the patterns from all other markets. 
When combined, these extend the size of the user base 
in terms of the number of markets, (creating stronger 
network effects,) and shared knowledge, (attracting user 
by delivering more value faster.). 
We contribute to the emerging literature on digital 
innovation [e.g., 44, 45] by offering a novel explanation 
of the processes that underpin digital ventures’ 
ambitions to scale their user base rapidly through GPR, 
as exemplified in the case of BlaBlaCar. We highlight 
that replication as a strategy [43] essential for the growth 
of the digital venture. Rather than simply relying on 
adaptation to market conditions, our approach involves 
leveraging coherent structures [3] that evolve with size 
and replication, allowing digital ventures to create 
innovation opportunities, whilst solving daily 
challenges, thorough the process of GPR. 
Additionally, we contribute to the understanding of 
user base growth [21] by outlining the process by which 
digital ventures can overcome market variation 
internationally, conceptualizing this growth as 
multidimensional and as increasing the knowledge 
transferred between the markets through replication. 
There are a few limitations of the research. First, our 
research builds on an in-depth case study. Future 
research should consider including a wider variety of 
cases to allow for comparative analysis. Furthermore, it 
would have been useful to have access to more powerful 
data on the dependent variable, that is, user base. This 
would have allowed more careful analysis of how 
particular replication acts influenced the scaling 
process. Further research, with access to a more 
comprehensive dataset on the user base across time, 
might be able to trace variation in the replication acts 
and offer a dynamic theory of this interesting 
phenomenon. 
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